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Abstract
With the wide availability of GPS-enabled mobile devices, spatio-temporal data
is being collected and stored for providing location-based services or for data an-
alytics. Location-based advertisement, market research, and data mining are just
some of the motivations for collecting spatio-temporal data. However, location data
is also very sensitive since it may reveal information about the data subject such as
his/her political views, religion, state of health, and various personal preferences,
which is considered private information. One of the approaches to protect sensi-
tive location data is obfuscation. In this thesis, we have implemented two location
obfuscation techniques, performed an analytical and experimental study to inves-
tigate how effective they are on a state of the art attack algorithm designed for
spatio-temporal data. In the attack scenario, given a set of known trajectories,
and a distance matrix composed of known pairwise distances between trajectories,
adversary tries to approximate the target trajectory and then extract information
about absence or presence of the trajectory in a given area. We used obfuscation
techniques to hide information around predefined sensitive places such as hospitals,
medical centers. We then used obfuscated data on the attack. Experimental results
show that the applied obfuscation methods do not help protecting the privacy of
users in sensitive areas in case of spatio-temporal trajectories that follow a regular
pattern. We observed that the attack method works successfully because the ob-
fuscation techniques do not scatter the sensitive points far enough from sensitive
places and the linearity of the trajectory is preserved.
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O¨zet
GPS-etkin mobil cihazların genis¸ ulas¸ılabilirlig˘i sayesinde mekan-zaman verileri
toplanıyor ve konum temelli servislere temin etmek ic¸in veya veri analizi ic¸in de-
polanıyor. Konum-temelli reklamcılık, pazar aras¸tırması ve veri madencilig˘i mekan-
zaman verisinin toplanmasında motivasyonlardan sadece bir kac¸ı. Fakat, konum bil-
gisi ayrıca c¸ok hassas bir bilgi c¸u¨nku¨ o¨zel bilgi olarak du¨s¸u¨nu¨len politik go¨ru¨s¸, din,
sag˘lık durumu ve c¸es¸itli kis¸isel tercihler hakkında bilgileri ac¸ıg˘a c¸ıkarabilir. Hassas
konum bilgilerini koruma yo¨ntemlerinden biri gizlemedir. Bu tezde, iki konum gi-
zleme teknig˘ini uyguladık, mekan-zaman verisi ic¸in tasarlanan modern bir saldırı
algoritmasında ne kadar etkili oldug˘unu aras¸tırmak amacıyla analitik ve deney-
sel c¸alıs¸malar yu¨ru¨ttu¨k. Saldırı senaryosunda, kars¸ı taraf, bir grup yo¨ru¨ngeler ve
yo¨ru¨ngeler arasındaki ikili uzaklıklardan olus¸an uzaklık matrisi bilinirken hedeflenen
bir yo¨ru¨ngeyi tahmin etmeye c¸alıs¸ıyor ve daha sonra belirli bir alanda yo¨ru¨ngenin
varlıg˘ı veya yoklug˘u hakkında bilgi c¸ıkarıyor. Gizleme tekniklerini o¨nceden tanımlı
hastaneler, tıp merkezleri gibi hassas yerler etrafındaki bilgiyi saklamak ic¸in kul-
landık. Deney sonuc¸ları go¨steriyor ki uygulanan gizleme teknikleri mekan-zaman
yo¨ru¨ngelerinin du¨zenli bir paterni takip etmeleri durumunda hassas bo¨lgelerdeki kul-
lanıcıların mahremiyetini korumak konusunda yardımcı olmuyor. Gizleme teknikleri
hassas yo¨ru¨nge noktalarını hassas yerlerin yeterince uzag˘ına dag˘ıtmadıg˘ı ic¸in ve
yo¨ru¨ngelerin lineerlig˘i korundug˘u ic¸in saldırı metodunun bas¸arılı bir s¸ekilde c¸alıs¸tıg˘ını
go¨zlemledik.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Privacy issues in spatio-temporal data collected have become more of a concern
due to the availability of mobile devices with embedded GPS such as smart phones,
phablets and tablets. Spatio-temporal data is collected by mobile service provider
companies for various purposes and mostly for data analytics. On the other hand,
spatio-temporal data is also very sensitive since it contains information about where
a pedestrian/vehicle passed by or spent some time. Places stopped or visited could
be a meeting place, medical facility, religious building, which may reveal personal
information about the data subject such as his/her political views, religion, state
of health or personal preferences. Especially health-status, religion, and sexual life
are considered private information and protected by regulations in US, Europe, and
many other countries with an established data protection regulation.
Collected spatio-temporal data might be requested by other companies, for mar-
ket research, advertisement or data mining in general. When a third party re-
quests this sensitive spatio-temporal data, then privacy preserving techniques should
be applied before releasing this data. Privacy preserving techniques for spatio-
temporal data can be classified into three main groups: (1) access-control policies,
(2) anonymity, and (3) obfuscation. Access-control policies are the classical way
of protection. Parties that hold permission of the user can have access to personal
information. However, if the permission holder does not need whole personal infor-
mation, it would be an unnecessary disclosure of data. Furthermore, whether giving
permission or not, it is not flexible for an entity that provides service according to
privacy preferences of user. k-anonymity is another technique, in which a user’s data
is cloaked, usually through generalization, such that he/she is indistinguishable from
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at least k-1 other users. In this way, his/her identity is preserved. This approach
needs a third party to be involved and make the necessary changes before releasing
the data, which may not be trusted. Besides, this technique does not apply for areas
in which it is hard to obtain k users within a reasonable distance in case of location
data. Obfuscation techniques are applied via degrading the precision or accuracy
([3]). Although user’s identity is revealed, his/her true location is either changed
or generalized, thus privacy of the user is preserved. It has a trade-off between
the quality of location information, which is important for Location-Based Services
(LBS) to provide good service, and privacy of the user.
In this thesis, we concentrate on two obfuscation techniques. One of them is
a method that we designed, while the other one is a state of the art technique
available in the literature. We implemented those techniques as a tool with a visu-
alization feature to identify points of interests and sensitive locations together with
the data subject’s trajectory. Later, we attacked the obfuscated data and analyzed
the outcome of the attack.
Our method for obfuscation perturbs sensitive data points, provided that the
sensitive locations are specified as points of interest. The obfuscation is done such
that the user does not appear to be in those locations. Therefore, our method
introduces inaccuracy to the data. We have the trajectory, which has points ordered
in time; a sensitive point is obfuscated according to its non-sensitive next point such
that a circle of candidate data points around this next point is formed. This circle
has a radius of average neighboring distance of trajectory points. Then they are
mapped to the nearest road segment. One of the two non-sensitive points, having the
smallest road distance from the original sensitive point is selected randomly. Thus,
the method takes the direction of the movement into account, uses map information
and includes randomization to provide further protection against attacks.
The alternative obfuscation technique we considered is the one proposed in [1].
In this technique, location points are treated as circles because of the imprecision of
location sensing technologies. Privacy of the location measurement is expressed as
a metric, which is independent of the sensing technology, depending on the initial
measurement and the best possible measurement that technology permits. User
determines the privacy preference and the final area to be reached providing the
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requested privacy. To enable the demanded privacy, obfuscation operators are in-
troduced, grouped into two, basic obfuscation operators and operators formed as
a combination of them. Basic obfuscation operators are Shift, Enlarge and Re-
duce. Shift operator shifts the center of the location measurement while Enlarge
and Reduce are changing the radius of the measurement accordingly. Furthermore,
combination of these operators can be obtained when these operators are applied
as a sequence. The common characteristic of all these operators is that final area
should have some overlapping parts with the initial area.
We used an attack algorithm proposed in [2] to attack the obfuscated data pro-
duced by the obfuscation techniques mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. In the
scenario of the attack, adversary knows small number of trajectories and targets
an unknown trajectory by using the dissimilarity matrix, which contains pairwise
distances between trajectories. Besides, linear interpolation for the missing points
was used. Linear interpolation is necessary to attack target with small number of
known trajectories. It is because for 2n known trajectories, target is modeled as n
points. In case n is smaller than the size of the trajectory, remaining points can be
interpolated such that the interpolated points respect the matrix. Attack produces
candidate trajectories for the target and by analyzing probability distribution of
those candidates around an area, adversary can anticipate the presence or absence
of the user in the chosen area.
For the attack algorithm mentioned above, we chose the sensitive areas to cal-
culate the confidence of area to extract the presence information of the user. We
observed that that above mentioned obfuscation methods are not adequate to pre-
serve privacy of the user in POIs when the adversary of the attack chooses the radius
of the areas as 500 or 1000 meters to calculate the confidence. Furthermore, those
obfuscation techniques do not destroy the trajectories’ linearity, which further helps
the success of the attack.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives information about the back-
ground and related work on our research area. In Chapter 3, we express the mo-
tivation for the thesis. In Chapter 4, the obfuscation method that we proposed is
explained in detail. In Chapter 5, the alternative obfuscation technique is discussed.
In Chapter 6, the applied attack method is analyzed while in Chapter 7, our exper-
3
imental setting is explained and results are discussed. In Chapter 8, we conclude
the thesis and mention about future works.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we will introduce background and related works in the fields
of privacy in data mining in general, and then privacy preserving data mining,
and privacy preserving data mining methods in spatio-temporal data which are
anonymization and obfuscation.
2.1 Privacy in Data Mining
Privacy is defined as the significance of protecting personal data from public [4].
Revealing personal information is, unless user preferences states so, considered as
privacy violation and all privacy preserving techniques are trying to prevent such
cases. Increase in mobile devices and enhanced technology led to huge amount of
spatio-temporal data. Thus, those collected vast data stimulated the privacy in
spatio-temporal data. The important point for those collected data is that they
should reveal information according to the preferences of people. If information
goes beyond the choice of the individual, then privacy leak occurs. Furthermore,
information through different channels may also result in privacy leak when they are
combined and used for data mining which attempts extracting useful information
from data. Such privacy leaks are presented in [5–7]. In the next section we present
some of the available techniques to protect privacy.
2.2 Privacy Preserving Data Mining
As mentioned in the previous section, vast collected data have stimulated privacy
preserving data mining. It is because of the aforementioned data that should be re-
arranged according to the privacy demand of the users before using in data mining
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techniques. Rearrangement of the data is accomplished through privacy preserving
techniques. In [8], privacy is introduced in the field of data mining and later studies
on this topic followed. One way of providing privacy is removing the attributes of
data which lead to identification of a person. The authors of [9] propose a method
which eliminates the particular data which may result in revealing the correlation
rules in database. Data is still provided to the other parties but rules are kept
private. Furthermore, in [10], a method that utilizes secure multi-party computa-
tion to cluster horizontally separated spatio-temporal data is proposed as a privacy
preserving data mining technique.
2.3 Privacy in Spatio-Temporal Data
Increase in mobile devices which have GPS capability made location based ser-
vices (LBS) prevalent as discussed in [1,11–14]. LBS, which are providing the service
according to the user’s position, increased the need for privacy techniques in spatio-
temporal data. In this area, privacy preserving techniques can be categorized as
anonymization and obfuscation.
One way of providing privacy for spatio-temporal data is anonymization which
is discussed in [12, 15–19]. Among these works, in [16] and [17] anonymization of
trajectories is targeted. However, in [20], it is shown that segments of trajectories can
be used to reveal the remaining parts of trajectories. Furthermore, to prevent such
a case, authors propose a method in which trajectories are considered as vertically
partitioned and distributed across various parties where each party is trying to find
out the rest of the trajectory. A suppression technique is introduced against such
privacy leak.
Obfuscation is another approach to provide privacy for an individual which ba-
sically perturbs the data. However, it can be in the form of generalization as well.
This technique is interest of research in [1,11,21]. In [1], authors propose obfuscation
operators such as shift, enlarge, and reduce which are geometry based, not looking
at the map information and each location point is treated as individually circular
areas so path is not considered. However, in [21], authors propose a database level
approach in which geographical information is also utilized while obfuscating. On
the other hand, in [22] it is discussed that since the change pattern in the data can
6
be anticipated, obfuscation may not protect the privacy.
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries and Thesis Motivation
In this chapter, we give the background information in Section 3.1 for the ob-
fuscation method proposed in [1] and attack method presented in [2]. We used this
obfuscation method and the method we designed to evaluate their effectiveness ac-
cording to the attack method. After providing the background information for the
thesis, we explain the thesis motivation in Section 3.2.
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Basic Concepts
In this section, basic concepts for the obfuscation operators discussed in Chap-
ter 5 are explained.
Positions of users are represented as circular areas since it is not expected that
sensing technologies would return exact location information.
Location Measurement
Location measurement for a user u, is denoted by Ai = (xi, yi, ri), calculated by
location sensors, and following conditions hold:
1. P ((xu, yu) ∈ Ai) = 1
2. P ((xu, yu) ∈ A), where A = (x, y, δr) ⊂ Ai is the neighborhood of (x, y), is
uniformly distributed
In these conditions, while first one states that a location measurement exactly con-
tains the real position of the user, the second condition shows the real position of
the user can be anywhere within Ai.
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Relevance
Relevance is proposed as a metric of the privacy of location measurement and
defined as Ri = r
2
o/r
2
i for a location measurement Ai = (xi, yi, ri), where ro is the
radius of the area, the best that technology permits, while ri is the radius of the Ai
returned from the location sensors. As it is seen relevance is independent from the
sensing technology and its value is in the range of (0, 1), as it approaches to 1, the
accuracy increases.
Location Privacy
In association with relevance, location privacy is 1 − Ri, for the location mea-
surement Ai. As relevance increases, location privacy decreases. Users can set their
privacy preferences in terms of final relevance Rf , the relevance to be obtained,
independent from the application context.
Accuracy Degradation
Accuracy degradation to be achieved is the ratio Rf/Ri, where Ri is the initial
relevance and Rf is the final relevance set by the user (See Equation 3.1 and Figure
3.1). Obfuscation is done to achieve Rf , transforming the initial location measure-
ment Ai to Af in such a way that P ((xu, yu) ∈ Af ) > 0 which implies Ai and Af
should be overlapping. Obfuscation is done only if Ri > Rf , otherwise the sensing
technology already provides the requested privacy.
λ =
Rf
Ri
=
(Ai ∩ Af )2
AiAf
(3.1)
Figure 3.1: Accuracy degradation, taken from [1]
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3.1.2 Attack Method
In [2], the authors propose a method which can identify any unknown trajec-
tory, given the dissimilarity matrix and a small number of known trajectories. The
method succeeds:
• Adversary is able to predict the presence or absence of an individual in a
circular area with a certain confidence which is directly proportional to the
radius of the area.
• Although a small number of trajectories are known, adversary is able to iden-
tify the presence with high confidence.
Algorithm works as follows; given r number of known trajectories, adversary is trying
to reconstruct the target trajectory with p points. Each point has two unknown
(latitude, longitude), therefore 2p equations are required to reconstruct the target,
each pairwise distance between target and known trajectory forms an equation.
Therefore, 2p equations correspond to 2p number of known trajectories. However,
even though r < 2p, adversary can express the remaining 2p − r missing points
in terms of the unknown points by using interpolation. Interpolation can be done
in many ways, so each interpolation yields a different candidate trajectory. All
candidate trajectories adapt the pairwise distances released through the dissimilarity
matrix. Furthermore, without additional information, each candidate trajectory has
equal probability to be the target. Since it is not practical to find all candidates,
authors follow Monte Carlo approach; they run the algorithm many times, each with
different interpolation and obtain a distribution to approximate the target. Then
those candidate trajectories are used to infer absence or presence of an individual
in a given area.
Dissimilarity Matrix
Trajectories are represented as a two dimensional vector T = (p1, ..., pn) where
point pi = (xi, yi) and they are produced by constant sampling rate, so time attribute
is not used. As distance metric, Euclidean distance is used, the distance between
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trajectories are defined as follows:
(T − T ′)2 =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
|pi − p′i|2 (3.2)
The technique uses Euclidean distance which is applicable to the trajectories of the
same length. Dissimilarity matrix D is an m × m matrix for trajectories ST =
{T 1, ..., Tm}, each value of the matrix is calculated as D(i, j) = (T i − T j)2, thus
each entry of the matrix corresponds to a pairwise distance between two trajectory
and the matrix contains all pairwise distances between trajectories. An example is
given below:
Data set Distances
Trajectory 1:[(1,1)(2,2)(3,3)] D(2,1)=
√
3
Trajectory 2:[(2,1)(3,2)(4,3)] D(3,1)=
√
15
Trajectory 3:[(2,3)(3,4)(4,5)] D(2,3)=
√
12
Dissimilarity Matrix
Trajectory ID 1 2 3
1 0
√
3
√
15
2 - 0
√
12
3 - - 0
Table 3.1: Dissimilarity Matrix, taken from [2]
Problem Definition
It is stated that target trajectory T r can be fully reconstructed if the number
of known trajectories k has the following property, k = 2n + 1, where n is the
number of points in trajectories. If k < 2n + 1, then there are infinite number
of candidate trajectories, which are distance preserving, satisfying all pairwise dis-
tance conditions. Distance preserving trajectories cannot be distinguished from the
target trajectory, however since it is not feasible to generate all possible candidate
trajectories, following observation used to narrow the search space for the target:
• Consecutive data points in trajectory are not independent of each other. If a
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point pi is in sequence with another point pi+1, it is most likely to be in the
neighborhood of pi+1.
This observation is the incentive for interpolated trajectories. A trajectory is mod-
eled as including m points. If original trajectories contain more than m points,
then the remaining points can be obtained through interpolation. m main points
forms m− 1 line segments and the number of interpolated points to include in each
segment is determined by a set S.
The problem is defined as attacking a target trajectory, given a set of known
trajectories of size 2k, and a distance matrix, such that finding set of candidate
trajectories which are distance preserving and remaining points out of k are inter-
polated.
Assumptions made by the method are as follows:
1. Trajectories are following a road network
2. Trajectories have a constant sampling rate
3. A small number of trajectories are known by adversary
Confidence-Based Attack
Confidence of a given area is the output of the attack algorithm which is the
probability that target individual is present in the area. In order to do that, proba-
bility distribution around the point of interest is calculated and then later this value
is used to infer with a certain confidence whether the target individual present or
absent in that region. Algorithm works as follows:
1. A predefined number of iterations, distance preserving interpolated candidates
are generated with ordered set of indices S which is randomly generated, and
it yields each segment of candidate T c has random number of interpolated
points. All T c are distance preserving and they have k
2
main points and the
rest of the points n− k
2
are interpolated by utilizing S.
2. Then by using the candidate trajectories confidence of a given area A is cal-
culated as |CA|/|CT |, where CT is the total number of candidate trajectories
for the target, CA is the number of candidates passing through area A.
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For example, as you can see in Figure 3.2, for the target T r, four (T c1,T c2,T c3,T c4)
out of five trajectories passes through region shown as circle with radius r, therefore
the confidence of area is 80%.
Candidate generation is done given the ordered set of indices S, and pairwise
distance set. n − k
2
points are linearly interpolated. They are written in terms of
the main points and by using the pairwise distances between trajectories, k
2
linear
equations are solved, and each root of main points yields another distance preserving
candidate trajectories.
Figure 3.2: Confidence of area, taken from [2]
Higher the number of candidates, higher is the probability that the target trajec-
tory is close to one of the candidates. Therefore size of the candidates is important
for the attack in order to succeed.
Another criteria that is important for the success of the attack is sampling rate,
as dependency between trajectory points increases, it makes possible the linear
interpolation to be meaningful. Since the data used in our experiments has high
sampling rate of 60 seconds, it is an advantage for the attack.
The attack method relies on the linear interpolation, so linearity of the data is
an indicator of a successful attack.
Furthermore, in experiments, authors observe that as the number of known tra-
jectories increases, adversary is able to obtain high confidence in smaller area while
extracting the presence information about user.
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3.2 Thesis Motivation
Increase in the availability of spatio-temporal data led to necessity of privacy
preserving techniques. As discussed in the previous chapter, obfuscation is one of
them. Obfuscation techniques changes the true location of the person or it gener-
alizes the location, thus preserving the privacy. However, while evaluating privacy
preserving techniques, we need to consider adversary behaviour and try to make the
method resistant to such attacks.
We used two obfuscation techniques to protect privacy of trajectories in prede-
fined sensitive areas. One of them is a method suggested in [1] and the other one is
a method that we designed. We used those techniques for obfuscation of the data
and ran the attack algorithm described in [2].
The method of [1] uses an adversary model in their work to evaluate the robust-
ness of their obfuscation operators. If the de-obfuscation cannot be done successfully,
those operators are said to be robust. If the adversary is not able to obtain a rele-
vance higher than the relevance of the obfuscated area, de-obfuscation is interpreted
as unsuccessful. The adversary is attacking by reducing or enlarging the radius of
the obfuscated area to reduce the effect of obfuscation and obtain lower relevance.
Their findings show that without the knowledge of the operator being used, the
success rate of the adversary is below the 50%.
The method we designed is modeled such that it prevents adversary behaviour
referring the map information and anticipating where the data is obfuscated. It
is because the obfuscation is done only on sensitive data points. This protection
is enabled by the method ensuring the obfuscated point to be on the road again.
Besides, it is chosen as one of two points around the circle of next non-sensitive
point and has the smallest distance from the original sensitive point. Therefore, the
obfuscated point which is ensured as non-sensitive usually falls between the original
sensitive point and the next non-sensitive point. Thus, trajectory is preserved.
However, when we use the attack scenario explained in [2], in which adversary
knows a set of trajectories and trying to find out places where an unknown target
trajectory is present or absent, given only a matrix containing pairwise distances
between trajectories, these obfuscation techniques do not work. Adversary is still
able to extract information about presence of target trajectory in sensitive areas even
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though target’s location points are obfuscated in sensitive areas. It is because when
the area, in which presence is the concern, is chosen large enough that attacker is still
able to conclude a person is present in that area. Those obfuscation methods do not
help to protect his/her privacy since they do not scatter the obfuscated point enough
to stay outside of that sensitive area. Furthermore, those approaches preserve the
linearity of the trajectory after the obfuscation which further contributes to the
success of the attack.
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Chapter 4
Proposed Obfuscation Method
This chapter describes the obfuscation method that we designed and imple-
mented. The method obfuscates data points of trajectories falling into predefined
sensitive places by utilizing the map information.
4.1 Preparation of Data
Preparation of data to obfuscate consists of two steps.
4.1.1 Elimination of Repetitive Points
First step of preparation is eliminating the repetitive points in trajectories, which
is simply merging consecutive points in a trajectory that has the same latitude and
longitude value. This is required for the Interpolation Attack to operate, since it
calculates distance matrix and repetitive points in the trajectories cause singular
matrix which is not invertible.
4.1.2 Merging Sensitive Points
The data points which are consecutive in the data (according to time) and falling
into the same sensitive place are merged into one point which is the middle point
according to their order in the data, in this way other sensitive points are eliminated.
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(a) Before merging (b) After merging
Figure 4.1: Sensitive points before and after merging step
4.2 Sensitive Places
The sensitive places can be determined according to which places are considered
as sensitive, it is a relative issue, while some people define cafes, bars as sensitive
places, some might think hospitals, pharmacies to be sensitive. In this work, health
related places such as hospitals, medical centers are defined as sensitive and they
are considered as circular, specified by the latitude and longitude as their center,
and radius value. While considering a point falling into a sensitive place, haversine
formula is used to calculate distance between two points on a sphere, specified by
latitude and longitude value (See Equation (4.1)), and GPS error is also taken into
consideration. If the distance between data point and the center of the sensitive
place is less than or equal to the radius of the sensitive place summed up with GPS
error, the data point is considered as sensitive.
4.3 Method
The method only obfuscates the trajectory points that exist in predefined sen-
sitive places (S). Therefore for each point, it is checked if the point is sensitive. By
using Equation (4.1) distance between the sensitive location center and the point is
found.
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u = sin(
lat2− lat1
2
)
v = sin(
lon2− lon1
2
)
dist = 2re arcsin(
√
u2 + cos(lat1) cos(lat2)v2)
(4.1)
re: Radius of earth
lat1, lon1: latitude, longitude of the sensitive place in radians
lat2, lon2: latitude and longitude of the trajectory point in radians
If the distance (dist) is smaller than the sum of radius of the sensitive location
Sm and GPS error, this trajectory point is interpreted as sensitive and obfuscation
is done according to following steps:
1. For each sensitive point in trajectory Ti we try to find the next non-sensitive
data point (dk)
2. When we find dk a circle is formed around this point with radius calculated in
Eqn. 4.2 which is the average neighboring distance of trajectories. Around the
circle, candidate points to replace the sensitive points are formed such that all
are equally separated by angle, which is determined by the predefined number
of candidate points. Finding latitude and longitude of candidate points is
calculated in Eqn. 4.3 ∑
∀Ti∈T
n−2∑
k=0
dist(dk+1, dk) (4.2)
dist: distance calculated between two points according to Eqn. 4.1
n: number of data points in a trajectory (one point contains both latitude and
longitude value, all trajectories have the same number of data points)
lat = arcsin(sin(lat1) cos(d) + cos(lat1) sin(d) cos(θ))
dlon = arctan(
sin(θ) sin(d) cos(lat1)
cos(d)− sin(lat1) sin(lat))
lon = ((lon1 − dlon+ pi) mod 2pi)− pi
(4.3)
θ: Angle between the non-sensitive point and the candidate point, if it is zero,
then longitude does not change above lon calculation is not used
lat, lon: Calculated latitude, longitude value of the candidate
d: Distance, which is the radius of the circle in our case. It is in radians so
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the radius is divided by the earth radius
lat1, lon1: Latitude, longitude of the non-sensitive point which is used as the
center of the circle
Each candidate is produced with different θ value which is starting from 0 and
increased by 2pi/(number of candidates) for each candidate until 2pi. Among
those candidates, sensitive ones are eliminated.
3. All candidate points are mapped to the nearest road as we are dealing with
vehicle trajectories.
4. If the number of candidate points is less than n (defined as 2 in our case),
then the radius of the circle is increased by a predefined amount (10 meters in
our case) and the procedure is repeated from 2 to 4 until at least n number of
non-sensitive points are found around the circle mapped to the road.
5. Those candidate points are sorted according to their road distance from the
original sensitive point.
6. Among the candidate points, n points having the smallest distance is deter-
mined and one of these n points is selected randomly to replace the sensitive
point.
7. If the last point of the trajectory is sensitive, there isn’t any next non-sensitive
point, then the same procedure is applied from the 2, however the circle is
formed around this sensitive point instead of the next non-sensitive one.
An example of the obfuscation method is shown in Figure 4.2. Candidates
around the next non-sensitive point formerly form a circle, and then those points are
mapped into the nearest road around them. These points are sorted according to
their distance. One of the n points (2 is chosen in our experiments) having smallest
distance is chosen randomly to replace the sensitive point.
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Figure 4.2: Road mapped candidates around next non-sensitive point
Pink Pinpoint: Sensitive trajectory point
Green Pinpoint: Candidate point formed to replace sensitive point
Purple Pinpoint: Non-sensitive trajectory point
Orange Pinpoint: Chosen point to replace sensitive point
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Chapter 5
A State of the Art Obfuscation Method
This chapter is about the obfuscation method explained in [1]. We explain
obfuscation operators proposed by the authors, discuss their effectiveness for the
attack method that we used in this thesis, and then we compare this method with
our obfuscation method explained in Chapter 4.
5.1 Obfuscation Operators
All obfuscation operators takes Ai,Rf and Ri as input and gives an output which
is the obfuscated area with relevance Rf . Next section defines basic operators which
achieve obfuscation either by changing the radius or shifting the center. Further-
more, we discuss those operators based on their effectiveness when we use this
operator in a setting that sensitive places are defined and the goal is to hide the
location information falling into a sensitive place. Later, combination of these op-
erators are explained. At last, we compared the method we designed and explained
in Chapter 4 with the method explained in this chapter.
5.1.1 Basic Obfuscation Operators
Enlarge (E)
Produces an obfuscated area which has radius rf > ri. This operator decreases
the probability that the real position of the user is a particular point within the
neighborhood of Af , while the real position remains in Af (See Figure 5.2). Final
radius is calculated by following Equation (3.1)
Rf
Ri
=
(Ai ∩ Af )2
AiAf
=
Ai
Af
=
r2i
r2f
(5.1)
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rf = ri
√√√√Ri
Rf
(5.2)
The effect can be seen in Figure 5.1, Af is shown by red circle while Ai is
demonstrated by blue circle.
Figure 5.1: Enlarge (E) Operator
Figure 5.2: pdf of Enlarge (E) Operator
When we use this operator in a setting mentioned in Section 5.1, this operator
does not operate well, because if a location measurement overlaps with the sensitive
area, obfuscation based on enlargement does not remove its overlapping. In fact,
the overlapping area usually gets bigger, so it is still overlapping with the place
that presence of the individual is supposed to be hidden, and it is inferred that the
individual is in the sensitive place (See Figure 5.3). Therefore in the attack that is
explained on the Chapter 6, this operator wouldn’t serve as a protection of sensitive
data.
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Figure 5.3: Enlarge (E) operator, bad case
Reduce (R)
Produces an obfuscated area which has radius rf < ri. Although this operator
may not seem right as an obfuscation technique, it decreases the probability that the
real position falls within the region Af while the probability density function’s(pdf)
value remains the same (See Figure 5.5). Final radius is calculated by following
Equation 3.1
Rf
Ri
=
(Ai ∩ Af )2
AiAf
=
Af
Ai
=
r2f
r2i
(5.3)
rf = ri
√√√√Rf
Ri
(5.4)
The effect can be seen on Figure 5.4, Af is shown by red circle while Ai is
demonstrated by blue circle.
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Figure 5.4: Reduce (R) Operator
Figure 5.5: pdf of Reduce (R) Operator
This operator could work well in the context explained in Section 5.1. It occurs
when the original location measurement extends over a sensitive place, and it is
obfuscated with R operator such that no overlapping part with the sensitive place
exists anymore as is seen on Figure 5.6) where a sensitive place is shown by a black
circle, centered on yellow pinpoint.
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Figure 5.6: Reduce (R) operator, good case
However, there can be a situation when R operator does not help conserving the
sensitive data point. As you can see on Figure 5.7, original data point resides in the
sensitive place, R operator, reduces its radius but the location measurement of the
data point still overlaps with the sensitive area.
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Figure 5.7: Reduce (R) operator, bad case
Shift (S)
Unlike the previous operators, shift operator does not change the radius, instead
it changes the center of the area such that (xf , yf ) = (xi + d sin(θ), yi + d cos(θ)),
where d ∈ (0, 2ri] is the distance between the center of Ai and Af , and θ is the
rotation angle. This operator decreases both the probability that the real user is in
the neighborhood of Af and the probability that the real position is contained within
Af . θ is generated randomly and d is found by solving the following equations:
Since Ai and Af have the same area, from Equation 3.1
Ai ∩ Af = pir2i
√√√√Rf
Ri
(5.5)
When the term Ai ∩ Af is interpreted by the distance d between the centers,
following equations formed, where σ and γ are central angles of circular areas Ai
and Af , λ = Rf/Ri
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[
σ
2
r2i −
r2i
2
sinσ
]
+
[
γ
2
r2f −
r2f
2
sin γ
]
=
√
λpirirf
d = ri cos
σ
2
+ rf cos
γ
2
ri sin
σ
2
= rf sin
γ
2
(5.6)
Since areas have the same radius value ri = rf , those equations simplify as,
σ − sinσ =
√
λpi
d = 2ri cos
σ
2
(5.7)
Solving the Equation 5.7 gives the distance d, and the other unknown θ is chosen
randomly to calculate obfuscated area Af .
See Figure 5.8, Af is shown by red color while Ai is demonstrated by blue.
Figure 5.8: Shift (S) Operator
Figure 5.9: pdf of Shift (S) Operator
This operator may not result in a desired obfuscation according to a sensitive
place, it is because we have high precision of location measurement as presented in
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Section 7.4, so S operator does not perturb data enough to protect the sensitive data
point. Furthermore, rotation angle is chosen randomly, sensitive place’s location is
not considered. Therefore it may result in such a case in Figure 5.10. The S operator
does not serve as a privacy measure for this particular data. Therefore, in the attack
of Chapter 6, this operator is not expected to succeed.
Figure 5.10: Shift (S) operator, bad case
5.1.2 Combination of the Basic Obfuscation Operators
Combination of basic obfuscation operators is when two of them is applied in
sequence. Authors state that it is not necessary to combine more than two operators
since an area A1 = (x1, y1, r1) can be converted to another area A2 = (x2, y2, r2) by
only applying two operators:
• Shifting the center
• Enlarging or reducing the radius
The important point to note while combining operators is that the relation between
final area A′ and the initial area Ai is A′ ∩ Ai 6= ∅. Furthermore, while combining
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operators, relevance is decreased gradually. First operator decreases the relevance
from Ri to Rm which is chosen randomly between Ri and Rf and produces area
Am = (xm, ym, rm), second operator decreases relevance Rm to Rf which is the final
relevance to be achieved at the end of obfuscation according to user privacy pref-
erence and produces the final area Af = (xf , yf , rf )(See Figure 5.11). In following
sections operators used in this work are explained.
Figure 5.11: Relevance while combining operators, taken from [1]
Shift and Enlarge (SE) Operator
First Step is Shift Operator which is done by applying the operator explained in
5.1.1. Input is Ai = (xi, yi, ri), output is Am = (xm, ym, rm). Calculation of xm,ym
and rm is shown on Table 5.1. In this calculation, d is found by Equation (5.7).
xm ym rm
xi + d sin θ yi + d sin θ ri
Table 5.1: Shift Operator when used as first step in combination of operators
Second Step is Enlarge Operator which is done by applying the Enlarge Operator
mentioned in 5.1.1. In this part, whether the initial area Ai is fully included in the
final area Af or they are partially overlapped, these two cases are treated differently
since authors states that these two cases have different behaviours when analyzed
against an attack to eliminate obfuscation effects. Input is Am = (xm, ym, rm), which
is the output of the first step, output is Af = (xf , ym, rf ). Calculation of xf ,yf and
rf for partial overlapping case is shown below. In this calculation, rf is found by
Equation (5.6).
29
xf yf rf
xm ym > rm
Table 5.2: Enlarge Operator when used as second step in combination of operators,
partial overlapping case
Figure 5.12: SE Operator, partial overlapping case
Calculation of xf ,yf and rf for inclusion case is shown below.
xf yf rf
xm ym rm
√
Ri
Rf
Table 5.3: Enlarge Operator when used as second step in combination of operators,
inclusion case
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Figure 5.13: SE Operator, inclusion case
Shift and Reduce (SR) Operator
First Step is Shift Operator which is done by applying the operator explained in
5.1.1. Input is Ai = (xi, yi, ri), output is Am = (xm, ym, rm). Calculation of xm,ym
and rm is shown on Table 5.1.
Second Step is Reduce Operator which is done by applying the Reduce Operator
mentioned in 5.1.1. Input is Am = (xm, ym, rm), which is the output of the first step,
output is Af = (xf , ym, rf ). Calculation of xf ,yf and rf for inclusion case is shown
below.
xf yf rf
xm ym rm
√
Rf
Ri
Table 5.4: Reduce Operator when used as second step in combination of operators,
inclusion case
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Figure 5.14: SR Operator, inclusion case
We used operators explained in this chapter for obfuscation of our data. Our
setting and results are explained in Chapter 7.
5.2 Comparison of Obfuscation Methods
In this work, we used two obfuscation methods, the method explained in this
chapter and the method introduced in Chapter 4 that we designed. In this section
their differences are examined.
The method explained in Chapter 4, perturbs the data such that original point
does not necessarily overlap with the obfuscated point, whereas the method ex-
plained in this chapter ensures the final location measurement to overlap with the
original point so it does not spoil the data entirely.
Our method ensures that the obfuscated point does not fall into the sensitive
place anymore. However the method explained in this chapter does not guarantee
that the obfuscated point will not reside in the sensitive place. We showed those
cases in figures of Section 5.1.1.
In the introduced method of Chapter 4, obfuscation is done such that the tra-
jectory is not ruined, because the places where data points are out of the trajectory
can be used by the adversary to attack by just looking at the map and infer that the
data point actually falling into a sensitive place and it is perturbed. Therefore this
approach can be protective based on attacks involving looking at the map, but it
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cannot protect the sensitive data when linear interpolation based attack is applied
as mentioned on Chapter 6.
On the other hand, the method mentioned on [1] treats location points individ-
ually, not considering as if they are connected through a path. This method may
reveal sensitive information when only sensitive data points are obfuscated such that
change in the precision of points may indicate sensitivity of the data point. Fur-
thermore, the perturbation including S operator can result in the obfuscated point
to be out of the trajectory if the precision of location measurement is low. However,
the data used in this work has high precision as mentioned in Section 7.4.
Another aspect that differs in those approaches is utilizing map information.
Introduced method in the previous chapter, takes advantage of it and candidate
points are mapped to the road and one of the two points having the shortest road
distance from original point to the candidate point is chosen randomly. Therefore,
it can be said that this method is highly dependent on the map information whereas
the method of [1] does not take it into account, operators including S, E may produce
areas where a vehicle cannot reside in such as lake, car banned places or any other
place in which roads are not contained.
In addition to that, the method of Chapter 4 utilizes background information of
the data. It produces obfuscated points ensuring they are still following the same
trajectory. However this is not the case for the method explained in this chapter.
It does not take into account the background information of the data. If it is used
on data with low precision of location measurement, the resulting obfuscated points
that are out of trajectory can be used on the map to infer an individual is in a
sensitive place.
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Chapter 6
Attack Method
In this chapter, effectiveness of obfuscation approaches mentioned in Chapter 4
and Chapter 5 are discussed when the attack method proposed in [2] is used.
Preliminaries for this attack method are explained in Chapter 3.
The method of Chapter 4, ensures the obfuscated point is on the road, and
it is the candidate point having one of the two smallest distances from original
sensitive point, and is located around the next non-sensitive point. Purpose of such
obfuscation is not to spoil the trajectory, but it further helps keeping the linearity
as seen in the Figure 6.1, where red line indicates the original trajectory, blue line
is the obfuscated trajectory, the direction of the movement is indicated with the
arrow. As is seen, the trajectory’s linearity is preserved making it susceptible to the
attack method.
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Figure 6.1: Linear approach of the obfuscation method introduced in Chapter 4
Furthermore, obfuscation operators explained in Chapter 5 does not perturb the
trajectory, thus keeping the linearity. When Operators E and R are used individu-
ally, they only change the radius of the location point. If S operator included in the
obfuscation, the location area’s center is shifted. Since we initially have high pre-
cision of location measurement and resulting obfuscated areas should overlap with
the initial location measurement, we didn’t see any shift of the center that destroy
trajectory fully, as we examined the obfuscated data. We can see an example in
Figure 6.2, where green line shows original path and orange line shows the path
after the obfuscation. Although data point is shifted, trajectory is slightly moved
and linearity is preserved. Thus, it can be concluded that the attack method could
succeed on this obfuscation technique.
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Figure 6.2: Linear approach of the obfuscation method introduced in Chapter 5
Moreover, the radius values of 500 meters or 1000 meters are chosen for the area
of which confidence of area to be calculated. From the attacker point of view, this is
accurate enough to conclude that the target trajectory actually appears in this area.
To be enduring for such an attack, the obfuscation method should ensure that the
obfuscated points are 500/1000 meters away from the sensitive locations. However
methods explained in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 does not work this way.
In our obfuscation method, we only ensure that the obfuscated point does not fall
into the sensitive place, which has a 44 meters radius on average. Our method takes
into account the direction of the movement and preserving the trajectory. Thus, the
obfuscated point usually falls into between the original sensitive point and the next
non-sensitive point (See Figure 6.3). Average neighboring distance for our data is
calculated to be 90 meters as mentioned in Section 7.4. Therefore, our method does
not protect the sensitive data when such big radius values are chosen to calculate
the confidence of area.
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Figure 6.3: Distance between center of sensitive area and the obfuscated point with
circle around with radius of GPS error
Pink Pinpoint: Sensitive trajectory point
Green Pinpoint: Candidate point to replace sensitive point
Purple Pinpoint: Non-sensitive trajectory point
Orange Pinpoint: Chosen point to replace sensitive point
The method explained in Chapter 5 does not even guarantee that the obfuscated
point does not reside in the sensitive area (See Figures 5.3, 5.7, 5.10). Even if the
produced obfuscated circular area does not overlap with the sensitive place, it is
not expected that the obfuscated area would be 500 meters away from the sensitive
location center. It is because the final area produced by the operators should have
some overlapping part with the initial area. In our context, initial area has radius
(ri) of 30 meters as mentioned in Section 7.4. In order to be sensitive, this initial
location measurement should have overlapping parts with the sensitive area As (we
only obfuscate when the initial location measurement is sensitive). As is seen in
Figure 6.4, the case, where the obfuscated final area is the farthest from the center
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of the sensitive area, is obtained by the S operator or the SE, partial overlapping
operator. In those cases, the distance can be at most rs + 2ri where rs is the radius
of the sensitive area. In our setting, ri is 30 meters and average of rs is 44 meters.
Therefore, on average the obfuscated area is 104 meters away from the midpoint
of sensitive place. This indicates those obfuscation operators are not adequate to
protect the data when radius of 500 meters or more is used to calculate the confidence
of area.
Figure 6.4: Distance calculation for the case where the obfuscated final area is the
farthest from the center of the sensitive area
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Chapter 7
Implementation and Experimental Results
In this chapter, firstly, we explain the format used in our experiments for tra-
jectories and sensitive data. In Section 7.3, we give information about the tool that
we have implemented. Then, in Section 7.4, the setting for our experiments is ex-
plained. The parameters used in obfuscation methods, the approach we followed in
obfuscation and our confidence of area calculation are explained. At last, results are
discussed in Section 7.5 according to the outputs of experiments.
7.1 Trajectory Data
We used vehicles’ trajectory data tracked by GPS for 30 days. Initially data had
attributes such as vehicle id, position time stamp, latitude, longitude, direction and
speed as seen in Table 7.1. Data attributes such as time stamp, direction, speed
are not used in our context. We further processed the data such that if the vehicle
does not move more than 2 minutes, we started a new trajectory, thus trajectory
ids formed and vehicle ids are not used. Then we realized there are some repetitive
points in the data, we eliminated them as mentioned in Section 4.1.1, and then
consecutive sensitive data points are merged as explained in Section 4.1.2. The
size of the trajectories did not match, which is necessary for the attack to operate,
therefore we determined the size of 125 points for each trajectory and the rest of
the data has been removed. The format of the data used in obfuscation methods
explained in this work is in Table 7.2. Each point is represented by point ID which
is unique in all data, trajectory ID which is the trajectory the point belongs to,
trajectory point ID, the point’s ID in the trajectory and the point’s latitude and
longitude values. At the end of the operations we had 183 trajectories each having
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125 points.
Vehicle ID Time Stamp Latitude Longitude Direction Speed
38347 07/10/2013 17:43:39 40.987517 29.023072 GUNEY 0
52689 07/10/2013 17:43:09 40.978217 29.093 BATI 28
35882 07/10/2013 17:42:55 41.08417 28.97802 GUNEYDOGU 0
38346 07/10/2013 17:42:46 40.967903 29.08698 GUNEYBATI 0
Table 7.1: Example location data of company vehichles
Point ID Trajectory ID Trajectory Point ID Latitude Longitude
1 0 1 41.00311 29.022313
2 0 2 41.005005 29.029652
3 0 3 41.000322 29.05249
4 0 4 40.991113 29.077215
Table 7.2: Data format used in obfuscation methods
7.2 Sensitive Data
Sensitive data used in experiments described in Section 4.2. We extracted 45
health related places in Istanbul such as hospitals, medical centers etc. Each sen-
sitive place is considered as circular and represented by the latitude and longitude
value and the radius as seen in Table 7.3. Radii of sensitive places are calculated
individually.
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Latitude Longitude Radius
41.2903 27.9984 25.9605
41.2895 28.0016 24.2604
41.294 28.0051 27.6763
41.2859 27.9968 30.2208
41.2851 28.0012 29.8698
Table 7.3: Sensitive data format
7.3 Map Based Obfuscation and Visualization Tool
We implemented a tool to run the obfuscation algorithms mentioned in Chapter
5 and Chapter 4 (See Figure 7.1)
Figure 7.1: Tool
In this tool, we can visualize the data produced by obfuscation algorithms. Map
figures used in this work are produced by this tool. User can use this tool either
to visualize his/her data or to obfuscate his/her data and visualize it at the same
time.
If the user wants to obfuscate his/her own data, he/she enters the file name
for sensitive location and then the file name for the data to obfuscate (in formats
shown in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3) and presses ”Files Entered” button. Meanwhile
41
file checks are done whether they exist or not, user is then given choices to choose
how his/her data is ordered according to time, whether the time is increasing as you
move down in the list or is decreasing. We didn’t include time property but still the
order of the trajectories is important as it is explained in Chapter 4, the obfuscation
of a sensitive point is done according to its next non-sensitive point according to
time. This option is put on the tool to be more flexible to operate on any data.
However, ordering is not important for the obfuscation method explained in Chapter
5. Then the user chooses between obfuscation methods in Chapters 4 and 5. The
user presses the button according to which operation they want; according to which
the corresponding algorithm starts to run.
Figure 7.2: Tool close look
When calculations are done by the program, pinpoints on the map emerge. Then
user can zoom in to see further details in the data.
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Figure 7.3: Tool runs on data to obfuscate
Data after obfuscation of Chapter 4 can be seen on Figure 7.4. Non-sensitive
trajectory points are shown with purple pinpoints, while sensitive ones are pink,
candidate points are green and the chosen points to replace the sensitive ones ap-
pears as orange pinpoints. Furthermore, it is possible to access the information
of trajectory id and the order of the point in trajectory when the mouse is over a
pinpoint. In this way it is possible to analyze the obfuscation.
Figure 7.4: Trajectories visualized after obfuscation method of Chapter 4
The resulting location data as the output of the obfuscation method in Chap-
ter 5 can be seen in Figure 7.5 and data in more detail on Figure 7.6. Since this
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obfuscation method has operators such as E, R which are changing the radius of
the circular area, obfuscated location circles are indicated by red pinpoint and red
circle, while original location measurements are shown by blue pinpoint and blue
circle.
Figure 7.5: Trajectories visualized after obfuscation method of Chapter 5
Figure 7.6: Trajectories visualized after obfuscation method of Chapter 5 in detail
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Another scenario in which this tool can be used is when a user wants to visualize
his/her data. User enters the name of the file and the data is shown. Each data
point is indicated with red pinpoint. When the user moves the mouse on a pinpoint,
he/she can access the trajectory id and the order of the point in the trajectory. The
user can zoom in further to investigate the data. Resulting visualization can be seen
on Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: Trajectories visualized
7.4 Setting
We have used the tool, mentioned in the previous section for obfuscation methods
explained in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
7.4.1 Parameters
Parameters used to implement those obfuscation methods are given as follows:
Our obfuscation method needs three parameters, which are average neighboring
distance, GPS error in meters, and k anonymity number.
Average neighboring distance is calculated by Equation 4.2. It is simply summing
up distances between a trajectory’s data points, and it is repeated for all trajectories,
then it is divided by the number of data points in the whole data. In this way,
average neighboring distance between data points is calculated. For our data, it is
calculated as 90 meters.
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GPS error is given by the data provider. The GPS error value for our data is 30
meters.
n randomization number is used on the algorithm explained in Chapter 4 on step
4. It is used to further prevent adversaries by including randomization. n value we
used in our experiments is 2.
The other obfuscation method mentioned in Chapter 5, uses 3 parameters, ro,
ri and Rf .
ro is defined as the GPS error that could be achieved in the perfect environmental
conditions. This value is taken from the data provider and it is 10 meters.
ri is the GPS error in current location measurement which is 30 meters.
Rf is the final relevance to be determined by the user preferences. It is a value
between 0 and 1. The important point to note is that it should be smaller than
Ri = r
2
o/r
2
i . This is essential for the obfuscation to take place. Ri is calculated as
0.1 and the Rf is selected as 0.05.
7.4.2 Obfuscation
Since we are given the sensitive location data, data points falling into those
places are our concern. Therefore, we only obfuscated sensitive data points.
We explained obfuscation operators in Chapter 5. For each sensitive point, an
operator is selected randomly and obfuscated accordingly.
7.4.3 Confidence of Area
Confidence of area calculation is done as described in Section 3.1.2. Our objec-
tive of obfuscation is to hide the information of a trajectory passing by a sensitive
location. Therefore, we followed the following approach.
We traversed the original data set, when we came across a data point falling into
sensitive area, we calculated the confidence of the sensitive area for the corresponding
point in the candidate trajectory set. Thus, the value of the calculated confidence of
area is interpreted as can the attacker anticipate that the target trajectory passing
by a sensitive place. We used three different candidate trajectory set for our data,
which are produced by the attack described in Chapter 6. We calculated confidence
of area for each of them.
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One of the candidate trajectory set is produced when the original trajectories
are used as input for the attack. The other one is the outcome of the attack as
a result of the obfuscated input by using the obfuscation algorithm mentioned on
Chapter 4.
The third one is the resulting candidate trajectory set when the attack is fed
through the trajectories, which are obfuscated with the help of obfuscation operators
described in Chapter 5. While calculating the confidence of area, we took into
account the radius value produced by those operators for the point which originally is
sensitive. When the point is at most (sensitive area radius) + rf distance away from
the sensitive area center, then it is treated as sensitive. While for other candidate
sets, GPS error value is used, instead of the rf .
In our experiments, Confidence of area is calculated according to the same center
of the area but with various radius values to see its effects on the attack. When we
change the number of known trajectories, attack produces different set of candidate
trajectories, so confidence of area calculations are done again for these set of data.
7.5 Results
Results are expressed as confidence of area; the term is explained in Section 3.1.2.
In Figure 7.8, Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10 results can be seen. In figures, k is the
number of known trajectories, which is an important parameter of the attack. Graph
tagged as ”No Obfuscation” is the average of the confidence of area calculated by the
candidate trajectories generated when the attack is applied to the non-obfuscated
trajectories. ”Obfuscated (Samarati)” is the average of the confidence of area in
which candidate trajectories are obtained by the obfuscated trajectories, obfusca-
tion method used is explained on Chapter 5. ”Obfuscated” is the average of the
confidence of area which is obtained by candidate trajectories produced as a result
of attacking the obfuscated trajectories, and the method explained in Chapter 4 is
the applied the obfuscation method.
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Figure 7.8: Confidence of Area (COA) when k=30, according to the radius of the
area in which confidence is calculated, real r is the actual measured radius of the
sensitive place
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Figure 7.9: Confidence of Area (COA) when k=50, according to the radius of the
area in which confidence is calculated, real r is the actual measured radius of the
sensitive place
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Figure 7.10: Confidence of Area (COA) when k=70, according to the radius of the
area in which confidence is calculated, real r is the actual measured radius of the
sensitive place
In total 50 original trajectory points are found to be sensitive. The results in
Figure 7.8, Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10 are the average of confidence of areas for each
sensitive place, into which a location point falls.
In our experiments, we wanted to see how obfuscation techniques play a role
for the attack of [2]. We further investigated their relation to known number of
trajectories and the radius of the area of which confidence is calculated. We used
k (number of known trajectories) as 30, 50 and 70. Furthermore, we used radius
values of the measured real length of the area, which is 44 meters on average,
in addition, we used 200, 500 and 1000 meters as the radius of the area while
calculating the confidence. For each experiment, results of average confidence of
areas are compared. We can see that applied obfuscation techniques are not enough
to protect the sensitive data as the attacker calculates the probability distribution of
the candidate trajectory high enough to conclude the target resides in the sensitive
area. Adversary can obtain the success in an area of 1000 meters in the case of the
k=30, while radius of 500 meters is enough for the case of k=50 and k=70. When
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we use small radius values, for example, the real r or 200 meters, average confidence
of areas are low for all the cases, not particularly for the confidence of areas with
obfuscated trajectories. Hence, we cannot conclude that obfuscation techniques
are successful for those areas. Furthermore, we had an experiment to see whether
for big radius values of 500, 1000 meters, the confidence of areas are always high
even though trajectory is not passing nearby. We chose an area in Istanbul, where
trajectories were not passing nearby and all confidence of areas was zero, so we were
able to verify our results.
Besides, by looking at the results, we are able to conclude that as the number of
known trajectories gets higher, adversary is able to find out presence of the target
in areas with smaller radius values. Similarly, higher the radius of the area, higher
the average confidence of area gets.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we implemented two obfuscation techniques. One of them is a
method that we designed. The other one is a state of the art method explained
in [1]. Furthermore, we implemented a geo-spatial visualization tool which makes
it easier for an end user to specify sensitive locations. The visualization tool uses
the obfuscation methods and displays the obfuscated trajectories. Visual validation
of the obfuscation methods is achieved through the tool and then, we investigated
effects of the two obfuscation techniques on the attack algorithm proposed in [2].
We have devised an obfuscation method explained in Chapter 4. Given sensitive
locations, obfuscation is done such that the direction of the movement is considered
and the obfuscated point does not fall into the sensitive place anymore. If a location
point is sensitive, candidates are formed around its next trajectory point in a circle
which has a radius of average neighboring distance. Those points are mapped to
the nearest road segment. Among two points, which have the smallest road distance
from the original sensitive point, one is chosen randomly as obfuscated point. Thus
we aimed at perturbing the trajectory in a manner to prevent any adversary which
may observe obfuscation if the data around the sensitive location is perturbed too
much.
Besides the one we proposed, we have also implemented a state of the art obfus-
cation technique explained in [1], which treats the location points as circular areas
because location sensing sensors have a finite precision. Furthermore, it is referring
the best possible location measurement, and current privacy is expressed in terms
of these two location measurements. The obfuscation is done according to the user
preference. This method uses basic obfuscation operators which are Shift, Enlarge
52
and Reduce. While Shift only changes the center of the area, Enlarge and Reduce
change the radius of the location measurement. Furthermore, the combinations of
them, when they are used in a sequence, are applied such as Shift and Reduce, Shift
and Enlarge. Common characteristics of all these obfuscation operators is that they
should end up with a final location measurement providing the requested privacy,
and the final area obtained should have overlapping parts with the initial location
measurement. Thus, the final area is related to the initial area.
In order to evaluate the implemented obfuscation techniques, we tested the attack
algorithm explained in [2] on large scale real data set. The attack method tries to
find a target trajectory given a small set of known trajectories and their pairwise
distances as a Dissimilarity matrix, including the pairwise distances to the target
trajectory. Later the found probability distribution around a chosen area is used to
anticipate the presence of an individual in this area.
We used the traffic data located in Istanbul and sensitive locations which are
chosen as health related places such as hospitals, polyclinics, medical centers. Data
is obfuscated by using two techniques described above. Later, the obfuscated tra-
jectories as well as non-obfuscated (original) trajectories are used as input for the
attack. Resulting candidate trajectories are used to calculate the confidence of area
for sensitive locations. We only calculated confidence of area for the sensitive loca-
tion points in the original sensitive data, our aim was to test if the corresponding
point in candidate trajectory set still appears as sensitive or not after it is obfus-
cated. We have used different radius values for sensitive locations, although 500,
1000 meters provide enough accuracy for the adversary to conclude that a trajectory
is present. When we examined the confidence of areas, it is seen that the obfusca-
tion methods are not adequate for this attack. Attacker can obtain high confidence
of area when more than 500 meters are used as the radius of the area to calculate
the confidence. It is because the obfuscation methods used do not perturb the data
such that the obfuscated point is at least 500 meters away from the sensitive loca-
tion center. Furthermore, the linearity of the trajectory is not destroyed by those
techniques, which further assists the attack.
In addition, it is observed that higher the number of known points for the attack,
higher the confidence of area for the sensitive locations. Similarly, as radius of the
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area increases, confidence of area increases as well.
As a future work, the obfuscation method of Chapter 4 can be changed such that,
when candidates around the next non-sensitive points are snapped to the nearest
road, the distance from the sensitive location center could be taken into account.
If the distance is smaller than 500 meters, another circle around next non-sensitive
point can be formed with longer radius and the procedure can be repeated until such
candidates are found. Thus, attacker may not find the trajectory passing around
the sensitive place when 500 meters are used as the radius of that place.
Moreover, the technique explained in Chapter 5 may produce a better protection
for the attack if the underlying sensing technology has a low precision of 500 meters
or more. In this way, it can produce output where obfuscated points can be 500
meters away when Shift operator is included in the obfuscation, though it is not
guaranteed.
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